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Abstract
This article analyzes the impacts of debt relief on production and pollution. We develop a
two-country overlapping generations model with environmental externalities, public debts and
perfect mobility of assets. Pollutant emissions arise from production, but agents may invest
in pollution mitigation. Could debt relief be an efficient tool to encourage less developed
countries to engage in the fight against climate change? We consider a decrease of the debt
of the poor country balanced by an increase of the richer country’s debt. We show that
debt relief makes it possible to engage poor countries in the process of pollution abatement.
Capital, environmental quality and welfare can increase in both countries. This result relies
on the environmental sensitivity and the discount factor in the poor country relative to the
rich one: the greater they are the more beneficial the debt relief is.
JEL classification: F43, H23, Q56.
Keywords: Pollution; Abatement; Overlapping generations; Public debt; Capital market integra-
tion.
1 Introduction
The trend in CO2 emissions predicts a global temperature increase of more than 3oC by the
end of the century with severe consequences. Loss of agricultural yield, loss of biodiversity, sea
level rise, climate migration, extreme weather events... are all phenomena that will increase and
the brunt of the economic damages will be probably borne by poorest countries (Schelling, 1992;
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Mendelsohn, et al., 2006). To achieved a 1.5oC consistent pathway, the international community
calls for immediate global response. Meeting this challenge would require to accelerate the de-
ployment of mitigation actions and to have an active participation of all countries (see Coninck
et al., 2018). Regarding engagement of countries, important disparities prevail, as illustrated by
Table 1 that presents the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) for climate and energy for
several countries. This index provides a good proxy of country’s environmental engagement.
Countries Index Countries Index
Switzerland 90.55 Republic Czech 54.65
Sweden 86.8 Ireland 54.16
France 70.46 Netherlands 52.55
China 68.62 South Korea 46.75
Spain 67.77 United States of America 45.81
Denmark 67.56 Japan 45.08
Italy 65.14 India 44.77
Poland 64.33 Greece 42.17
Norway 63.58 Turkey 39.99
United Kingdom 63.06 Canada 39.88
Austria 62.79 Brazil 33.24
Portugal 62.33 Burkina Faso 26.24
Germany 55.47 Madagascar 16.23
Table 1 – The Climate & Energy Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 2018.
https: // epi. envirocenter. yale. edu/
Environmental objectives are a particular concern for poor countries in which the environ-
mental challenges are compounded by high levels of external economic vulnerability and public
debt. They recurrently use public debt to absorb the impact of external macroeconomic shocks
and, now, of more frequent natural disasters. In turn, higher levels of public debt associated with
weak macroeconomic situation increase fiscal pressure and constrain the capacity of countries to
address vulnerabilities and to mitigate pollution. According to IMF classification, a large part of
poor countries presents a high risk of experiencing a debt crisis, what underlines the importance
to compose with countries debt profiles to address environmental challenge.1
When we examine the diversity of instruments used to provide climate finance, debt transfers,
in the form of debt reliefs granted by developed countries to developing one, currently represent
only an insignificant proportion of financing strategies (see the Table 2 built by Fenton et al.,
2014).
Question then arises, does a debt transfer in favor of less developed countries is a relevant
macroeconomic policy lever to accompany environmental actions? This article contributes to this
question by using a theoretical approach combining debt transfers and global pollution issues.
We aim at analyzing the consequences of a debt transfer from rich to poor countries on mitigation
1See the debt sustainability framework of IMF and World Bank for public and external debt sustainability
analysis in low-income countries.
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Financial instruments Amount (million, US$) Share
Grants and related instruments 14379.1 45.2%
Unknown 614.4 1.9%
Multiple 419.3 1.3%
Loans, guarantees and insurance 14840.2 46.7%
Debt relief 82.5 0.3%
Capital contribution 1457.4 4.6%
Total 31792.9 100%
Table 2 – Instrument used to fulfill climate finance commitments.
From “Debt relief and financing climate change action”, A. Fenton, H. Wright, S. Afionis, J. Paavola and S.
Huq, Nature Climate Change (4), 2014. Based on data collected by the World Resource Institute
http: // go. nature. com. inshs. bib. cnrs. fr/ rMhVxK
decision of agents, as well as on pollution, GDP and well-being.
We develop a two-country overlapping generations (OLG) model with global pollution exter-
nalities and private mitigation. Production deteriorates the environmental quality, harming the
welfare of future generations. There is a perfect mobility of assets between countries. In line
with arguments previously presented, countries exhibit different macroeconomic profiles. They
have different saving rates, heterogeneous green awareness as well as productivities. In addition,
they are characterized by a different level of debt, which is financed by a tax on agents’ income
and by new debt emissions. To keep the analysis simple, we do not formalize public spending for
environmental protection, such that fiscal pressure is mainly determined by the debt level. The
relative productivity between countries determines their profile: we define the poor (resp. the
rich) country as those with the lower (resp. the higher) level of productivity.
To limit the effects of macroeconomic policy on fully integrated financial markets, we assume
that overall debt remains constant. This implies a constant global debt supply and no direct effect
of the debt policies on the international interest rate, even if it does not exclude composition effects
of debt among countries. This assumption can also be seen as a way to rule out unsustainable
global debt.
Accordingly, we study the environmental and economic consequences of a debt relief in favor
of the poorer country, founded by the richer country. Our research question leads us to focus
on situations in which, without any transfer, the poor country does not engage in environmen-
tal action while the rich one does it. We show that debt relief for this less involved country is
never sufficient to lead him to engage in the process of pollution abatement when its sensitivity
to environmental quality is low. When green awareness in the poor country is high enough, a
debt transfer can induce him to engage in actions to fight against climate change. This result is
confirmed even when the aid donor country faces high level of debt, as are most North-American
and Western European countries. In any case, such a policy can be good for both capital accu-
mulation and the environment depending on the preferences of the different countries. The debt
transfer translates into income tax variation and hence implies a redistribution of net income
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between countries. Given that bonds are used as debt instrument, the debt level has an effect
on the capital market equilibrium. It affects debt services, and therefore, the level of taxes. If
the poor country is the more patient, it increases net income and saving for the recipient while
reduces it for the donor. As poor and rich countries share a common international asset market,
global saving, capital stock and hence global pollution abatement increases only if the transfer is
in favor of the population that saves more. In such a case, welfare benefits are clear for the recipi-
ent. However, when the poor country is relatively impatient, it is not appropriate to implement a
debt transfer without any other economic and environmental actions, because even if it can help
him to engage in mitigation activities, the transfer reduces the global stock of capital and the
global level of effort to mitigate pollution. As the efficiency of abatement activities in reducing
emission is sufficiently important, the policy is damaging for environmental quality. Our analysis
sustains the interest of debt reliefs to address climate change issues, by providing the conditions
under which a debt transfer is an efficient macroeconomic instrument to promote environmental
actions.
As we have seen, our paper adopts a theoretical approach to contribute to two strands of the
economic literature, namely the interplay between public debt and environmental quality, and the
links between economic development and the environment in an international context. Connecting
these two strands, we provide new intuitions about the effects of international transfers on welfare
and the environment.
Debt financing has been introduced in dynamic models with environmental concerns (Boven-
berg and Heijdra, 1998; Heijdra et al., 2006; Fernandez et al., 2010). Debt policy only makes
possible to redistribute welfare gains from future to existing generations: there is no debt fi-
nancing of the pollution mitigation sectors. Fodha and Seegmuller (2012, 2014) and Fodha et al.
(2018) analyze debt financing schemes for public and private mitigation. They show that efficient
environmental tax reforms may be designed. This existing literature, however, considers closed
economies, which is a limitation as capital markets are interconnected and globalized, as climate.
Our work complements prior contributions that deal with global environmental issues in
international frameworks. This paper most directly extends three existing papers. John and
Pecchenino (1997) focus on the effects of cooperation between two countries in mitigating global
pollution. Their approach is simpler because there is no capital or savings arbitrage and they
only assume lump-sum transfers between countries. They conclude that the developing countries
must be compensated for their environmental expenditures. In our article, we focus on financial
markets and debt levels. Debt reduction is interesting because it has two effects. A direct one
plays the same role as a lump-sum transfer of income. An indirect one goes through the debt
service reduction. The second is the work of Bednar-Friedl et al. (2010). Countries differ in their
levels of public debt per capita such that one country is a net creditor and the other one is a net
debtor to the world economy. They find that if the country which unilaterally reduces its emissions
permits is a net creditor to the world economy, the domestic welfare costs are smaller and the
foreign welfare costs are larger than if it was a net debtor. While in this work mitigation efforts
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are exogenous, we differ by taking into account endogenous mitigation expenditure. Especially,
we study in details the effect of debt transfers when one country makes no effort to reduce its net
emissions. Third, Muller-Furstenberger and Schumacher (2017) propose a dynamic model where
all agents contribute to a global externality, but only those in a specific region suffer from it.
They develop an overlapping generations model with two types of agents. In the non integrated
economy, even though agents have the same technologies, if agents affected by the externality are
sufficiently poor in terms of initial capital endowments, they may be stuck in an environmental
poverty trap. Capital market integration helps to eliminate it. This article, although close to our
work, considers heterogeneity in the consequences of the climate change while we are interested in
heterogeneity in preferences. Moreover, in addition to the integrated capital market assumption,
we add public debt that influences savings and capital accumulation.
The consequences of international transfers have been particularly examined in the devel-
opment economic literature, to see if it provides development support for indebted countries.
While direct aid to poor countries are often criticized (see e.g Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar,
2000; Rajan and Subramanian, 2006; Dreher and Langlotz, 2017), Cassimon et al. (2015) and
Channing et al. (2016) conclude that the gains from debt cancellation promote health spending,
public investment, and tax mobilization within the recipient countries. We extend the discussion
by considering climate change issues and we give conditions such that untied debt cancellation
promotes also environmental quality and GDP per capita worldwide.
The literature has also questioned the characteristics of international transfers to protect
the environment. Baraano and San Martin (2015) develop a dynamic equilibrium model in
which public investments in both infrastructure and pollution abatement can be financed using
international aid. They find that transfers linked to both infrastructure and pollution abatement
may be the best welfare-enhancing alternative. Sakamoto et al. (2017) show that financial aid to
enhance adaptation capacity of vulnerable countries is efficient. They find that Norths assistance
to South can facilitate pollution mitigation in both regions. Another branch of the literature
consider the interplay between environmental finance and development aid transfers. Bretschger
and Suphaphiphat (2014) develop a two country growth model with two policy outcomes: climate
mitigation by the North to reduce global pollution and traditional development aid under the
form of income transfer. Because of low learning capacities in the South, they obtain that income
transfer is without effect on growth while active climate policy favors capital accumulation in both
countries and hence growth. In the same vein, Eyckmans et al. (2016) develop a theoretical model
in which North-South development transfers are complemented by mitigation and adaptation
transfers. Concerning the effects of a transfer for mitigation support, they underline that climate
change finance works as a pure income transfer, without effectiveness in terms of emission cuts
unless associated with matching grant. In our article, we depart from this literature as we limit
aid transfers to untied debt cancellation while technology against pollutant emission corresponds
to mitigation. Our work differs from these contributions by highlighting the role of private agents
in mitigation decisions, which depend on individuals preferences and net income.
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Finally, in our paper, debt relief is undertaken without any counterpart. Hence, our model
does not take into account debt for nature swaps (Deacon and Murphy, 1997; Cassimon et al.,
2011, 2014). The literature on economic development underlines the inefficiencies of this type of
aid as soon as donor country monitoring is not put in place. The risk of inefficiency of this policy
is all the higher as the country faces problems of quality governance, or extreme poverty. We
show the possibility of economic and environmental improvements even if debt relief is considered
without promise of any environmental action.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-country OLG
model with environmental externalities. Section 3 defines the equilibrium. Section 4 studies the
situations where agents in the poor country have a weak environmental sensitivity. Section 5
presents the opposite configuration. Technical details are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
The world consists of two competitive economies indexed by i ∈ {D,F}. Within each country,
a new generation of two-period lived agents is born at each period of time. Therefore, two
generations alive in each period t: the workers and the retired people. In each country, the
population size of the generation is constant and normalized to one. There is no mobility of labor
between countries, whereas there is a perfect mobility of the assets and the unique final good,
as for instance in Persson (1985). The assumption of perfect capital mobility can be seen as a
good approximation of what happens in countries with highly integrated financial markets and
few capital controls.2
2.1 Environmental quality
We consider the environment as a global public good, such as climate. We measure the evolu-
tion of this aggregate by an index, which deteriorates with pollution from global production and
improves with private abatement. We assume that both the rates of pollutant emissions and the
rates of abatement are equal among countries. In addition, we neglect natural degradation, so
the environment is a stock whose accumulation varies with net pollution. Mitigation consists in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere, by increasing energy efficiency, replacing
fossil fuels with new energies and enhancing the sinks that capture and store these gases. Miti-
gation could be reforestation, insulation of buildings or the development of carbon capture and
sequestration technologies. Global environmental quality Et evolves according to:
Et+1 = Et − θ(yDt + yFt) + φ(aDt + aFt) (1)
where yit and ait represent production and abatement of country i respectively, and E0 > 0. The
pollution flow resulting from production is given by the emission factor θ > 0 and efficiency of
2At the end of Section 5.2, we will provide intuitions about the mechanisms that operate when capital mobility
between countries is not prefect to compare with the situation with perfect mobility.
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abatement is given by factor φ > 0. We keep these parameters equal in order to focus on the
role played by debt, savings and mitigation decisions. Taking into account different values for
these parameters would be possible, but would only accentuate the effects of specialization. The
country with a high φ would have to mitigate, while the country with a low θ would have to
produce more.
2.2 Firms
In each country, producers use capital and labor for the production of a unique final good,
which is the numéraire. The technology used is Cobb-Douglas. Taking into account that labor
is unit, the production function writes yit = Aikαit, where kit denotes capital, Ai > 0 the global
productivity and α ∈ (0, 1) the capital share in income. Profit maximization gives:
wit = (1− α)Aikαit (2)
Rit = αAikα−1it (3)
with wit the wage and Rit the return of capital in country i.3
2.3 Households
A generation born at period t derives utility from consumption when young cit and old dit+1
and from environmental quality at both periods. Accordingly, the lifetime utility is given by:
ln cit + βi ln dit+1 + δi lnEt + γi lnEt+1 (4)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor in country i, and δi > 0 and γi > 0 the sensitivity
to environmental quality when young and old respectively. We assume that these preference
parameters are country specific, which means that βD 6= βF , δD 6= δF and γD 6= γF . On the
one hand, heterogeneity between βi is empirically supported by the work of Wang et al. (2016),
which present results from a large-scale international survey on time preference, conducted in 53
countries, and find that the waiting tendency is correlated with country specific characteristics,
like innovation, environmental protection, and crediting rating. On the other hand, δi and γi
aggregate both sensitivity and vulnerability to climate change which are also different among
rich and poor countries (Schelling, 1992; Mendelsohn et al., 2006).
When young, each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor and receives real wage wit.
A lump-sum tax τit is levied on this income, which is shared between consumption cit, savings
sit and private abatement ait, as in John and Pecchenino (1994). Indeed, young people take
care about the environmental quality they will face when old, but suffer from the past accumu-
lation of pollution. Consumption when old dit+1 is entirely financed by the remunerated savings.
3For simplification and taking into account the duration of a period, we assume full depreciation of capital after
one period of use.
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Therefore, the two budget constraints faced by an agent born at period t write:
cit + sit + ait = wit − τit (5)
dit+1 = Rit+1sit (6)
A young agent maximizes her utility (4) taking into account the two budget constraints (5)
and (6), the environmental quality (1) and the non-negativity of abatement ait > 0. We obtain:
dit+1 = βiRit+1cit (7)
Et+1 > γiφcit, with an equality when ait > 0 (8)
which also ensures Et+1 > 0 for all t > 0.
We deduce that we have two main situations. Either ait > 0 and:
sit =
βi
γiφ
Et+1, cit =
Et+1
γiφ
, dit+1 =
βi
γiφ
Rit+1Et+1 (9)
ait = wit − τit − 1 + βi
γiφ
Et+1 (10)
or ait = 0 and:
sit =
βi
1 + βi
(wit − τit), cit = 11 + βi (wit − τit) (11)
dit+1 =
βi
1 + βi
Rit+1(wit − τit), Et+1 > γiφ1 + βi (wit − τit) (12)
When environmental quality is high enough with respect to the net income, an agent has no
incentive to mitigate pollution. In contrast, if the net income is high enough and environmental
quality too low, she engages in abatement activities. The latter case is all more likely as γi is
high.
2.4 Government
The evolution of public debt in domestic and foreign countries and its consequences, espe-
cially on economic growth, is a major economic concern. Public debt issues are also included in
international debates on the environment, in which the connection between public debt and the
environment is recursively discussed. To keep analysis simple, we do not formalize public spend-
ing for environmental protection. Rather, we focus on interactions between public debt and the
environment in an international context by assuming that final action to reduce global pollution
is private. In this way, the government cannot directly use debt to finance future environmental
quality and the direct link between public debt and environmental policy is ignored.
In each country, the government faces the following budget constraint:
bit+1 = Ritbit − τit (13)
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with the initial public debt level bi0 > 0 given. The government collects lump sum tax τ on
workers and uses bonds as debt instrument. Its expenditures include repayment of debt and
interest payments.
3 Equilibrium
As international capital mobility is assumed to be perfect, foreign and domestic assets yield
the same rate of return. Market clearing requires world savings equal to world investment:
RDt = RFt (14)
sDt + sFt = kDt+1 + bDt+1 + kFt+1 + bFt+1 (15)
Given the production technologies in each country, the law of motion for environmental quality
is given by:
Et+1 = Et − θ(ADkαDt +AFkαFt) + φ(aDt + aFt) (16)
and Et > 0. Using (3), equation (14) means that:
kFt = kDt
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
(17)
We will investigate policies where debt in both countries are exogenous policy parameters, i.e.
bDt = bD and bFt = bF for all t, while τDt and τFt are endogenous and satisfy the government
budgets. In this way, public debt is a policy variable and the economic sustainability of public
debt is satisfied at each period. Equation (13) becomes:
τit = (αAikα−1it − 1)bi (18)
We consider a domestic economy richer than the foreign one. Numerous studies emphasize that
the major part of the difference in incomes between rich and poor countries is due to differences
in total factor productivity (see the survey by Caselli, 2005, and the study by Hsieh and Klenow,
2010).
Assumption 1 AD > AF .
Despite this assumption on the productivities between countries, we do not impose any ranking
on the respective debt levels, i.e. bD higher or smaller than bF . We will in particular analyze the
effect of an increase of bD which allows to decrease bF . Such a measure implies a redistribution
of income net of tax from the rich to the poor country, as the tax paid in each country linearly
depends on bi. However, we will see that the effects of a debt transfer quantitatively differ from a
standard redistribution of income because it goes through different channels compare to a simple
transfer of income. In addition, qualitative differences emerge if we consider imperfect capital
mobility, as discussed at the end of Section 5.2.
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We focus on equilibria with aDt > 0 and either aFt > 0 or aFt = 0. Equilibria without any
abatement activities are excluded from our analysis, while situations in which only one of the
country do not invest in environmental protection are examined. Indeed, when both countries do
not engage in mitigation, the net pollution flow is positive at each date, leading to a perpetual
decrease in the quality of the environment that rules out any stationary equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium with aDt > 0 and aFt = 0
We focus here on an asymmetric equilibrium where only the domestic households are engaged
in pollution mitigation. This means that:
φγD
1 + βD
[(1− α)ADkαDt − τDt] > Et+1 > φγF1 + βF
[
(1− α)AF kαDt
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α − τFt
]
(19)
Using (2), (11), (10) and (17), equilibrium on the asset market (15) satisfies:
kDt+1
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
− βD
γDφ
Et+1 + bDt+1 + bFt+1
= βF1 + βF
[
(1− α)AFkαDt
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α − τFt
]
(20)
Substituting (2), (10), (17) and aFt = 0, equation (16) becomes:
(
1 + 1 + βD
γD
)
Et+1 = Et − φτDt +ADkαDt
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
(21)
An equilibrium with aDt > 0 and aFt = 0 satisfies equations (20) and (21), taking into account
that inequalities (19) hold and the government budget constraint is given by (18).
3.2 Equilibrium with aDt > 0 and aFt > 0
Using inequality (12), we deduce that aDt > 0 and aFt > 0 require:
Et+1 < φmin
{
γD
1 + βD
[(1− α)ADkαDt − τDt] ; γF1 + βF
[
(1− α)AF kαDt
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α − τFt
]}
(22)
Using (9) and (17), the equilibrium condition (15) rewrites:
1
φ
Et+1
(
βD
γD
+ βF
γF
)
= kDt+1
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bDt+1 + bFt+1 (23)
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Now, using (2), (10) and (17), the dynamics of environmental quality (16) becomes:(
1 + 1 + βD
γD
+ 1 + βF
γF
)
Et+1 = Et − φ(τDt + τFt)
+ADkαDt [φ(1− α)− θ]
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(24)
An equilibrium with aDt > 0 and aFt > 0 satisfies equations (23) and (24), taking into account
the government budget constraint (18) and inequalities (22).
4 A foreign economy with low environmental sensitivity (γF ar-
bitrarily small)
We consider first a foreign economy with green awareness lower than in the domestic economy,
and even arbitrarily small and close to zero.
Assumption 2 γF arbitrarily small, satisfying γF < γD, and close to 0.
Substituting (18) in (19), the economy is in the asymmetric case aDt > 0 and aFt = 0 if the
following inequalities are satisfied:
Et+1 <
φγD
1 + βD
[
(1− α)ADkαDt − bD
(
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
)]
(25)
Et+1 >
φγF
1 + βF
[
(1− α)ADkαDt
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − bF
(
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
)]
(26)
Under Assumption 2, we note that any steady state (kD, E) will satisfy equation (26), meaning
that there will be no steady state with aF > 0 when γF is small and close to zero. This leads
us to restrict our attention to equilibria such that aDt > 0 and aFt = 0 when Assumption 2 is
satisfied.
4.1 Dynamics and steady states
Substituting (18) in equations (20) and (21), we obtain the dynamic behavior of the model:
kDt+1
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
− βD
γDφ
Et+1 + bD +
bF
1 + βF
= βF1 + βF
[
(1− α)AFkαDt
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α − bFαADkα−1Dt
]
(27)
(
1 + 1 + βD
γD
)
Et+1 = Et − φbD
[
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
]
+ADkαDt
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
(28)
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Substituting (28) into (27), we get:
kDt+1
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
= − bD(1 + γD)1 + βD + γD −
bF
1 + βF
+ βD1 + βD + γD
Et
φ
+ kαDt
[
(1− α)AF
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α βF
1 + βF
+AD
(
1− α− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
))
βD
1 + βD + γD
]
− αAF kα−1Dt
[
bFβF
1 + βF
+ bDβD1 + βD + γD
]
(29)
The dynamic system (28) and (29) explicitly gives (Et+1, kDt+1) as functions of (Et, kDt).
Now, we use it to analyse the existence and the number of steady states, and their stability
properties.
Using (28), we deduce that Et+1 > Et if and only if:
Et 6 ϕ(kDt) ≡{
ADk
α
Dt
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
− φbD
[
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
]} γD
1 + βD
(30)
To be able to ensure Et > 0 even if there is under-accumulation of capital (αADkα−1Dt > 1),
we assume:
Assumption 3 φ(1− α) > θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
.
This assumption can be easily interpreted. Indeed, it can be rewritten as φwD > θ(yD + yF )
meaning that when the rich country spends all its income on mitigation, it has to absorb more
than the total flow of pollution. This is empirically relevant because when the domestic advanced
economy does not save, capital is only financed by the poorest economy, meaning that the capital
stock and hence the pollution flow are low.
Using now (29), the inequality kDt+1 > kDt is equivalent to Et > ψ(kDt), with:
βD
1 + βD + γD
1
φ
ψ(kDt) = kDt
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bD(1 + γD)1 + βD + γD
+ bF1 + βF
− kαDt
[
(1− α)AF
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α βF
1 + βF
+AD
(
1− α− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
))
βD
1 + βD + γD
]
+ αAF kα−1Dt
[
bFβF
1 + βF
+ bDβD1 + βD + γD
]
(31)
We note that ϕ(kDt) is increasing and concave, while ψ(kDt) is U-shaped. Now, using (28),
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inequalities (25) and (26) are equivalent to:
Et < ADk
α
Dt
[
φγD
1 + βD
(1− α) + θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
−
(
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
) φγDbD
1 + βD
≡ CD(kDt)(32)
Et > −ADkαDt
[
φ(1− α)
(
1−
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α (1 + βD + γD)γF
(1 + βF )γD
)
− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
+
(
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
)
φ
[
bD − bF (1 + βD + γD)γF(1 + βF )γD
]
≡ CF (kDt) (33)
where CD(kDt) is increasing and concave and CF (kDt) is decreasing and convex. Moreover,
CD(kDt) > ϕ(kDt) for all kDt > 0, which means that a steady state satisfies aD > 0 whatever
the value of kD. As shown in Appendix 7.1, there is k > 0 such that for all kDt > k, we have
CD(kDt) > ϕ(kDt) > CF (kDt). We also show whether ψ(kDt) > CF (kDt). See Figure 1 for a
representation.
To complete the picture, a steady state is of course a solution (Et, kDt) = (Et+1, kDt+1) =
(E, kD) satisfying equations (27) and (28), which corresponds to the intersections between ϕ(kDt)
and ψ(kDt). This allows us to deduce the number of steady states depending on the importance
of the policy parameters bD and bF (see also Figure 1 for the case with two steady states):
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, there exist two steady states with aD > 0 and aF = 0,
namely (kj , Ej) with j = {l, h} and 0 < kl < kh, if public debt (at least in one country) is positive,
with bD and bF low enough. If public debt (in one or the two countries) is too large, there is no
steady state with aD > 0 and aF = 0.
If we further assume that:
α
1− α >
βD
1+βD +
βF
1+βF
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
(34)
the two existing steady states are characterized by under-accumulation.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2
Proposition 1 shows that there are two steady states with aD > 0 and aF = 0 when the public
debt in both countries is positive but not too high. This is a common feature of dynamic models
with a constant level of public debt, including those with pollution (see Fodha and Seegmuller
2012, 2014). Using the ingredients of this section and Appendix 7.1, we can also deduce the stabil-
ity properties of the steady states, drawing the phase diagram as depicted in Figure 1. The steady
state with the highest level of capital is stable, whereas the one with the lowest level of capital
is a saddle. Given that there are two predetermined variables, this last one is generically unstable.
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Figure 1 – Global dynamics under γF arbitrarily small.
As generations overlap, agents may over- or under-accumulate capital relatively to the usual
golden rule. The sufficient condition to have under-accumulation seems to be quite standard
since it requires that capital income over labor income has to be higher than a weighted sum
of the saving rates βi/(1 + βi). Under-accumulation ensures in particular that the tax levels
τi = bi(αAikα−1i − 1), for i = D,F , are positive as gouvernements are indebted.
4.2 Policy implications
This section explores how capital, environmental quality and the welfare of consumers could
be affected by changes of the level of public debt in both countries. More precisely, we examine
the effect of a bilateral debt relief in favor of the less advanced country i.e. the foreign one
i = F . We can justify this policy scheme using two arguments. First, the debt burden in poorest
countries can act as a brake on development, and richest countries must express support to relax
this constraint. Second, for fairness motives: the biggest contributor to climate change are rich-
more technological advanced- countries. This is consistent with the concept of climate justice
promoted by United Nations (2009): ‘[...] the world’s richest countries have contributed most to
the problem, they have a greater obligation to take action and to do so more quickly.”
Considering that Proposition 1 holds, we investigate the effect of a debt transfer, i.e. an
increase of bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount, on the stationary stock of
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capital and on the environment.4 Examining the government budget constraint given by (18),
a debt transfer directly translates into a variation of disposable income, positive for the country
that receives the transfer and negative for the contributor.
These comparative statics are evaluated at the steady state with the highest level of capital,
since it is the only one stable.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-3, bD and bF not too high and inequality (34):
• When the domestic economy is more patient that the foreign one, βD > βF , an increase of
bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount reduces Eh and kh.
• When the domestic economy is less patient that the foreign one, βD < βF , an increase of
bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount increases kh, and Eh if 5:
βF
1 + βF
− βD1 + βD >
1
bDX (35)
Proof. See Appendix 7.3
We first discuss the effect of the debt transfer on the level of capital. To understand the
economic mechanism, we recall the expressions of the savings in the two countries. Using (9) and
(10) on the one hand, and (11) on the other hand, we have:
sD =
βD
1 + βD
(wD − τD − aD), (36)
sF =
βF
1 + βF
(wF − τF ) (37)
In addition, the equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) evaluated at a steady state can be written:
sD + sF = kD
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bD + bF , (38)
aD =
θ
φ
ADk
α
D
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(39)
The increase of the public debt in the domestic economy means a larger taxation. We observe
the reverse mechanism in the foreign economy, where the level of public debt goes down. Debt
transfer entails a fall of savings in the domestic economy and an increase in the foreign one,
while the aggregate level of debt bD + bF is unchanged. The effect on global savings depends on
differences in time preferences, i.e βD compare to βF , which determine the saving rates in the two
countries. When βD > βF , the domestic economy is more patient, global savings go down, and,
given the perfect capital mobility, so does the stock of capital. We get the reverse result when
4Note that we would get the reverse result following an increase of bF associated to a decrease of bD.
5The expression for X is given in Appendix 7.3.
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βD < βF . This is due to a redistribution of net income from country D to country F. At a steady
state, environmental preferences do not modify this conclusion, even if savings in the domestic
economy depend on the environmental quality. As it is clear from equation (39), abatement along
the steady sate exactly compensates pollution flows coming from aggregate production. Because
of perfect mobility of assets, this implies that abatement is determined by the level of capital and
not the distribution of income.
Then, we emphasize the effects on the environmental quality. A policy that leads economies
to a state with a lower stock of capital reduces labor income and the environmental contribution
of the domestic economy. Given the efficiency of abatement compare to the polluting intensity
of production (Assumption 3), a fall in capital stock damages the environment. This is why a
debt transfer from the domestic to the foreign economy damages environmental quality when
βD > βF . When the foreign economy is more patient (βD < βF ), an additional condition is
required to ensure that a debt transfer from the domestic to the foreign economy is efficient to
improve the environment. Indeed, the domestic economy is the only contributor to environmental
protection and a policy aiming at increase its debt level would entail direct negative income effect,
with adverse consequences on abatement activities. The condition (35) presented in Proposition 2
implies that the elasticity of the capital stock to debt variation is sufficiently high to overtake the
direct negative effect of debt variation on abatement spendings through the variation of taxes.6
It especially requires a significant difference between βF and βD to ensure, following the debt
transfer, a high enough increase of global savings and, therefore, capital.
We investigate now the welfare effects of the debt transfer. Debt policy affects welfare though
its impact on the environment and on consumption spendings. The consumption part of the
welfare is affected by debt transfer through three effects: First, a direct debt effect, because
any variation in the level of debt changes the tax on income; Second, an income effect because
the variation of capital stock entailed by the policy modifies the return on labor and on capital;
Finally, a cost of debt effect because of the variation in the interest rate and hence of the country’s
debt burden. These effects can be competing. The welfare analysis is presented in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-3, bD and bF not too high, and α/(1−α) > max
{
βD
1+βD ;
βF
1+βF
}
,
we have the following results:
• For βD > βF , an increase of bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount reduces
the welfare in the domestic country while the impact is ambiguous for the foreign one.
• For βD < βF and under condition (35), an increase of bD associated to a decrease of bF of
the same amount increases the welfare in the foreign country while the impact is ambiguous
for the domestic one.
6For more details, see Appendix 7.3.
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Proof. See Appendix 7.4
When the foreign economy is impatient relative to the domestic one, a debt transfer in its
favor leads economies to converge to a lower stock of capital and to a worsen environmental
quality. Nevertheless, if the debt reduction is sufficiently high, these negative effects could, at
least partially, be compensated in the foreign country by the direct increase in consumption
spendings associated to a higher after-tax income.
The result is different if the foreign economy is relatively more patient and the variation of
the capital stock with respect to debt is sufficiency high to ensure that it drives an improvement
of the environmental quality. In such a situation, welfare improves in the foreign economy, while
the impact remains unclear for the welfare of the domestic economy because it suffers from an
increase in its debt. If it is highly sensitive to climate change issue (γD high enough), the better
environmental quality could a priori compensate the increase of tax burden.
We emphasize in this section that when the poorest economy is characterized by low envi-
ronmental concern (γF is arbitrarily small), the two steady states are always characterized by
the same configuration, i.e. domestic country contributes to environmental protection while the
foreign economy does not. As long as green awareness of foreign agents is too low, a debt transfer
from the domestic to the foreign economy is not an efficient policy tool to induce them to con-
tribute to the environment. Moreover, it reduces capital stock and environmental quality if the
richest economy is more patient. On the contrary, if the advanced economy is less patient, such
a transfer allows to converge to a higher stock of capital and to a better environmental quality.
In such a configuration, the debt relief is an efficient policy even if the poor country remains not
engaged in mitigation.
5 A foreign economy with a significant environmental sensitivity
(γF significant)
Now, households living in the foreign country are significantly concerned by environmental
quality, i.e. the preference parameter γF is no more arbitrarily small. We will highlight the policy
implications it will imply in comparison with the previous case. We especially emphasize some
configurations where debt transfers between the two countries may induce significant changes in
the private engagement concerning environmental mitigation. To be more specific, we assume:
Assumption 4 γF is high enough, satisfying the following inequality:
γF
1 + βF
> max
{(
AD
AF
) 1
1−α
; bD
bF
}
γD
1 + βD
By inspection of equation (32), we observe that the frontier defining whether aDt is positive
or not, namely Et = CD(kDt), is not affected by γF . Therefore, it has the same properties than
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in Section 4. However, under Assumption 4, Et = CF (kDt), defined in equation (33) and such
that aFt = 0, becomes an increasing and concave function.7 We will see that this will have strong
implications on the existence of steady states and on the effectiveness of policies making some
transfers of debt between the two countries.
We start by investigating the region where aDt > 0 and aFt > 0, which becomes relevant
because γF is high enough. We focus on the existence of steady states, their stability properties
and the effectiveness of debt transfers keeping bD + bF constant. Then, we will investigate
whether debt transfers allow to promote abatements in country F at the stable steady state
with the highest level of capital. We will analyze the consequences of such policies on capital,
environmental quality and welfare.
5.1 The regime with aDt > 0 and aFt > 0
Under Assumption 4, we study equilibria where both countries are engaging in abatements.
Using (18), equations (23) and (24) rewrite:
1
φ
Et+1
(
βD
γD
+ βF
γF
)
= kDt+1
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bD + bF (40)(
1 + 1 + βD
γD
+ 1 + βF
γF
)
Et+1 = Et − φ(bD + bF )
[
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
]
+ADkαDt [φ(1− α)− θ]
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(41)
Equation (41) gives the dynamics of environmental quality, whereas equation (40) gives a
static link between Et and kDt. Using (41), Et+1 > Et if and only if Et 6 Ω(kDt), with:(1 + βD
γD
+ 1 + βF
γF
)
Ω(kDt) = −φ(bD + bF )
[
αADk
α−1
Dt − 1
]
+ADkαDt [φ(1− α)− θ]
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(42)
where Ω(kDt) is strictly increasing and concave under Assumption 3. Substituting (41) into (40),
kDt+1 > kDt is equivalent to Et > Π(kDt), with:
Π(kDt) ≡ φγDγF + γF (1 + βD) + γD(1 + βF )
γFβD + γDβF
[
kDt
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
+ bD + bF
]
+ φ(bD + bF )(αADkα−1Dt − 1)−ADkαDt [φ(1− α)− θ]
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(43)
where Π(kDt) is a U-shaped function. Of course, all dynamic trajectory (kDt, Et) with aDt > 0
and aFt > 0 should satisfy Et < min {CF (kDt), CD(kDt)}.
7We will also have limkDt→0 CF (kDt) = −∞ and limkDt→+∞ CF (kDt) = +∞.
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We examine now if some long term steady states in which both countries contribute to envi-
ronmental protection may exist. To this aim, we analyze if positive abatement activities in the
foreign and the domestic good are compatible with a stationary stock of capital and a constant
value of environmental index.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, there exist two steady states with aD > 0 and
aF > 0, namely (ksj , Esj ) with j = {l, h} and 0 < ksl < ksh, if public debt (at least in one country)
is positive, with bD and bF low enough. If public debt (in one or the two countries) is too large,
there is no steady states with aD > 0 and aF > 0.
These steady states are admissible if Esj < min{CF (ksj ), CD(ksj )} is satisfied. If we further
assume that:
φ(1− α)− θ < α(1 + βD)γF + (1 + βF )γD
γFβD + γDβF
(44)
they are characterized by under-accumulation.
Proof. See Appendix 7.6
Note that the conditions for the existence of two steady states when aD > 0 and aF > 0 is
closely related to what happens when aD > 0 and aF = 0. In both cases, the debt levels should
be positive but not too high. Therefore, the question will be whether the steady states in each
regime are admissible or not, i.e. really satisfy aF > 0 or aF = 0 respectively. We also remark
that the sufficient condition to have under-accumulation is compatible with Assumption 3, for an
appropriate level of φ, if α (1+βD)γF+(1+βF )γDγF βD+γDβF > θ(AF /AD)
1
1−α , which is for instance satisfied for
θ low enough.
All the ingredients of this section also allow to deduce the dynamics when aDt > 0 and aFt > 0
showing that the steady state with the highest level of capital is stable, whereas the other one is
a saddle.
We can investigate the effects of public debt transfer when both countries contribute to the
environmental protection.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, assume that bD and bF are low enough. Any
increase of bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount has no effect on an equilibrium
with aDt > 0 and aFt > 0.
When both countries invest to improve environmental quality, a transfer of debt from the
domestic to the foreign country that let the total amount of debt bD+bF unchanged is useless. By
inspection of the equilibrium conditions (40) and (41), it does not modify any dynamic trajectory
characterized by aDt > 0 and aFt > 0.
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Using (9), (10), (15) and (16), the equilibrium conditions can be written:
sDt + sFt = kDt+1
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
+ bD + bF (45)
Et+1 = Et − θADkαDt
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
+ φ(aDt + aFt) (46)
where sit and ait are given by (9) and (10). Since sit can be expressed as functions of environmental
quality, aggregate savings do not depend on the distribution of income across countries. Therefore,
this heterogeneity of incomes between countries D and F has no effect on the asset equilibrium,
i.e. on capital. By inspection of (10), abatement linearly depends on income. Since the efficiency
of abatement on environmental quality φ is the same in both countries, the distribution of income
has also no effect on environmental quality.
5.2 The interplay between debt and the existence of steady states with envi-
ronmental mitigation
We investigate now if a policy consisting in debt transfers can promote the environmental
maintenance of the foreign economy, moving from an equilibrium with aFt = 0 to an equilibrium
with positive abatement aFt > 0. The underlying question is of course to know whether such a
policy is relevant to improve capital, environmental quality and welfare in a globalized world.
To be more specific, we will start with a configuration where there exist two steady states
with aD > 0 and aF = 0. Then, we will show that a debt transfer among countries will lead to a
configuration where the stable steady state with the highest level of capital moves from a situation
where aD > 0 and aF = 0 to a situation where aD > 0 and aF > 0. We will investigate what are
the implications of such a change of regime on capital, environmental quality and welfare.
Our explanations are based on phase diagrams, represented in Figures 2 and 3, which allows
to have a global picture of the existence of steady states and dynamics. We start by focusing on
equilibria with aDt > 0 and aFt = 0 when γF satisfies Assumption 4 and highlight the differences
with the previous case where γF is arbitrarily low. By inspection of equations (30)-(32), we
observe that ϕ(kDt), ψ(kDt) and CD(kDt) are not affected by γF , meaning that they have the
same properties than in Section 4. To locate these curves in the (kDt, Et) plane, especially with
respect to CD(kDt) and CF (kDt), we further assume:
Assumption 5
bD
bF
<
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
φ(1− α)
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
≡
(
bD
bF
)+
This assumption implies that bD/bF < (AD/AF )
1
1−α , meaning that the debt per GDP in
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advanced country, bD/A
1
1−α
D , is lower than in foreign country, bF /A
1
1−α
F .8
As shown in Appendix 7.5, where some technical details to construct the phase diagram when
γF is significant are relegated, we note that, on the one hand, ϕ(kDt) and Ω(kDt), that correspond
to Et+1 = Et, are both increasing and concave functions and cross the curve CF (kDt) at the same
point given by kDt = k1. Moreover, ϕ(kDt) > 0 for kDt > k0, ϕ(kDt) is above CF (kDt) for
kDt 6 k1 and Ω(kDt) is below CF (kDt) for kDt > k1, where k1 > k0 under Assumption 5. On
the other hand, ψ(kDt) and Π(kDt), that correspond to kDt+1 = kDt, are both convex U-shaped
functions that cross the curve CF (kDt) at the same points. We denote kDt = ka and kDt = kb,
with ka > kb these two points.
Using the constraint (26), a steady state with aD > 0 and aF = 0 requires9:
E >
φγF
1 + βF
[
(1− α)ADkαD
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − bF
(
αADk
α−1
D − 1
)]
(47)
Using (28), such a steady state should satisfy Θ(kD) < 0, with:
Θ(kD) ≡ ADkαD
[
(1− α)
(
γF
1 + βF
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − γD1 + βD
)
+ γD1 + βD
θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
+ (αADkα−1D − 1)
(
γDbD
1 + βD
− γF bF1 + βF
)
(48)
where Θ(kD) is an increasing function under Assumption 4. Of course, a steady state with aD > 0
and aF > 0 requires the opposite inequality, i.e. Θ(kD) > 0.
Using Appendices 7.2 and 7.6, there exist k̂ and k̂s such that the possible steady states kl and
kh with aF = 0 and aD > 0 are such that kl < kh < k̂ and the possible steady states ksl and ksh
with aF > 0 and aD > 0 are such that ksl < ksh < k̂s.
Therefore, only the steady states kl and kh exist if Θ(k̂s) < 0 and Θ(k̂) < 0. Let:
Σ ≡ γF bF1 + βF −
γDbD
1 + βD
(49)
These two inequalities are equivalent to Σ > Σ0 and Σ > Σ1, with:
Σ0 ≡
AD
(
J1
J2
) α
1−α
[
(1− α)
(
γF
1+βF
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − γD1+βD
)
+ γD1+βD
θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
αAD
J2
J1
− 1 > 0 (50)
Σ1 ≡
AD
(
G1
F1
) α
1−α
[
(1− α)
(
γF
1+βF
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − γD1+βD
)
+ γD1+βD
θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
αAD
F1
G1
− 1 > 0 (51)
8Note that Assumption 5 implies max
{(
AD
AF
) 1
1−α ; bD
bF
}
=
(
AD
AF
) 1
1−α . Thus, when Assumption 5 holds, As-
sumption 4 simplifies to γF1+βF >
(
AD
AF
) 1
1−α γD
1+βD
.
9In such a case, Propositions 2 and 3 will still apply, even if Assumption 2 does no more hold.
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Hence, there are only two steady states with aD > 0 and aF = 0 if Σ > max{Σ0,Σ1}. In
such a case, k1 is higher than ka (see Figure 2). Starting from this situation, consider some debt
transfers, which is to reduce bF and increase bD keeping bD + bF identical. It implies a reduction
of Σ. As shown in Appendix 7.5, this lowers k1. When bD/bF increases and tends to its upper
bound (bD/bF )+, k1 decreases towards k0. This means that there exists a value Σ∗ such that k1
is lower than ka for Σ < Σ∗. It is clear that for Σ < Σ∗ and Σ sufficiently close to Σ∗, one steady
state kl (< k1) with aD > 0 and aF = 0 coexists with one steady state ksh (> k1) with aD > 0
and aF > 0 (see Figure 3). Of course, we have Σ∗ < min{Σ0,Σ1}. Indeed, if Σ > Σ0, kh is an
admissible steady state, whereas if Σ > Σ1, ksh cannot be an admissible steady state.
We deduce the following proposition10:
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 3-5, bD and bF not too high, inequalities (34) and
(44), there exists Σ∗ ∈ (0,min{Σ0,Σ1}), such that:
1. If Σ > max{Σ0,Σ1}, there exist two steady states with aD > 0 and aF = 0, kl and kh;
2. If Σ < Σ∗ and Σ sufficiently close to Σ∗, there exists one steady state kl with aD > 0 and
aF = 0 and one steady state ksh with aD > 0 and aF > 0.
Therefore, an increase of bD associated to a decrease of bF of the same amount may allow to
move from a configuration where the two steady states are characterized by aD > 0 and aF = 0 to
a configuration where the steady state with the lowest level of capital is characterized by aD > 0
and aF = 0 and the steady state with the highest level of capital by aD > 0 and aF > 0.
This proposition shows that following a decrease of debt in country F exactly compensated
by an increase of debt in country D, the long-run stable steady state moves from a configuration
where environmental abatement is constrained in country F to a configuration where it is no
more. The stability properties of the steady states presented in Proposition 6 are deduced from
the analysis of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
10We are not interested in situations where environmental abatement of country F at the lowest steady state
becomes positive, because we think that it is more relevant to analyse the policy implications on the stable steady
state, which is characterized by the highest level of capital.
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                            Figure 2 – Global dynamics for Σ > max{Σ0,Σ1}
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Figure 3 – Global dynamics for Σ < Σ∗
Proposition 6 requires a set of assumptions. They are compatible with each other. Indeed, As-
sumptions 1 and 5 imply that AD/AF > max{(bD/bF )1−α; 1}, which is satisfied for an appropriate
set of the productivity parameters. Assumption 5 also requires the inequality bD/bF < (bD/bF )+
which involves appropriate debt levels. Taking into account these restrictions, Assumption 4
which simplifies to γF1+βF >
(
AD
AF
) 1
1−α γD
1+βD is fulfilled for an appropriate set of the preference pa-
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rameters γF and γD. Assumption 3 means a sufficiently low value of θ. In this case, inequalities
(34) and (44) are satisfied for βi low and α high enough, which are standard conditions to have
under-accumulation.
Considering that all these assumptions are satisfied, Proposition 6 shows that a high enough
debt transfer allows country F to engage into environmental mitigation. This occurs if either βD
is higher or lower than βF . Indeed, as we have already seen, the debt transfer means a lower
fiscal pressure in country F. Therefore, if the debt transfer is significant, the after-tax income
in country F is sufficiently high to finance also abatement. The marginal cost of engaging in
abatement becomes equal to its marginal benefit (see the first order conditions (9)-(10) and
(11)-(12)).
What is interesting is that we can further deduce some implications of the effect of such
a policy on the levels of capital, environmental quality and welfare at the stable steady state.
Using also Proposition 2,11 we see that when βD > βF , such a policy reduces the levels of capital
and environmental quality at the steady state kh with aD > 0 and aF = 0. When the transfer
of debt becomes high enough, the stable steady state is characterized by positive abatement in
both countries and is no more affected by the debt transfer between countries that we consider
(Proposition 5). In contrast, when βD < βF , the levels of capital and environmental quality at
the steady state kh with aD > 0 and aF = 0 increase. Again, when the debt transfer is sufficiently
high, the stable steady state enters the regime where both countries are engaged in environmental
mitigation and becomes independent of the debt transfer considered. Using Proposition 3 and
the property that the welfare can be expressed as a function of capital and environmental quality,
we can deduce the effect of the debt transfer on capital, environmental quality and the welfare of
each country.
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 3-5, bD and bF not too high, α/(1−α) > max
{
βD
1+βD ;
βF
1+βF
}
,
inequalities (34) and (44), a transfer of debt such that the economy moves from a stable steady
state with no foreign contribution to environmental protection (aF = 0) to a stable steady state
with foreign contribution (aF > 0), has the following implications:
• For βD > βF , capital, environmental quality and the welfare in the domestic country de-
creases while the impact is ambiguous for the welfare in the foreign one as long as aF = 0.
When aF becomes strictly positive, all these variables become invariant to the policy.
• For βD < βF and under condition (35), capital, environmental quality and the welfare in
the foreign country increases while the impact is ambiguous for the welfare in the domestic
country as long as aF = 0. When aF becomes strictly positive, all these variables become
invariant to the policy.
Such a policy of transferring debt from country F to country D is relevant in terms of the level
of capital, and also environmental quality, when country D is the most impatient one (βD lower
11As we have already explained, Propositions 2 and 3 also hold when Assumption 2 is not satisfied.
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than βF ). The debt transfer from one country to the other one implies a reallocation of income
net of taxes from country D to country F, since taxes increases in the first country, whereas it
decreases in the other one. Taking into account the equilibrium on the international asset market
(14) and (15), we know that capitals in both countries move in the same direction because the
returns are equal. This means that capital will increase if global saving raises. This is possible if
the redistribution of net income between countries is in favor of the population that saves more.
Such a debt transfer also allows to raise welfare in country F, whereas the effect on the welfare of
country D is not clear-cut. In addition, debt relief for poor countries can be used as a policy lever
by rich countries to help them to engage in environmental protection. Nonetheless, we reveal
that this instrument is useless once the unconstrained regime has been achieved. Therefore, the
effect of public transfer is maximum when the economy switches from the regime with aF = 0 to
the regime with aF > 0.
When country D is the most patient one (βD higher than βF ), we have some opposite conclu-
sions and economic mechanisms on capital and environmental quality. In addition, the negative
effect of debt transfer is the highest on capital, environmental quality and the welfare of country
D when one moves from the regime with aF = 0 to the regime with aF > 0. The impact on the
welfare of country F is however unclear.
We could observe that while the effect of the debt transfer on the welfare of foreign country
may be positive, it is never the case for the welfare of domestic country, without introducing
some adding restrictions on the parameters. This asks the question of the implementability of
the debt transfer for country D.
Short remarks on perfect mobility of assets and redistribution of income
Our setting with perfect capital mobility is a good approximation of what happens in countries
with highly developed financial markets and few capital controls. To have a more general view,
assuming imperfect capital mobility is a relevant option. When a debt transfer is implemented
in such a case, capital accumulation is in part crowded out in the donor country. Assuming that
the overall debt level is unchanged, this negative effect is offset if capital mobility is free, i.e if
the donor shares a common asset market with the beneficiary. As long as capital is not perfectly
mobile between countries, the donor would suffer from a crowding-out effect, in addition to a
negative net income effect due to a higher level of taxes. Reversely, the program would favor
the capital stock in the recipient country. The implementation of a debt transfer in a context
of imperfect capital mobility would affect severely the capital stock and hence mitigation efforts
in the rich country, while reverse results are observed in the poor country. Assuming that the
poor country is initially less engaged in environmental action, this policy would not favor the
global environmental quality. This suggests that perfect mobility of assets seems to be the most
favorable configuration to implement a debt relief policy.
In this case of perfect mobility, a debt transfer implies a redistribution of income net of tax
from the rich to the poor country. Indeed, recall that taxes paid by each country are given by
25
τi = (αAikα−1i −1)bi, i.e. linearly depend on bi. Therefore, any increase of bD exactly compensated
by a decrease of bF means a redistribution of net income from country D to country F. There is
however an adding effect that goes through the interest factor αAikα−1i , which (in)decreases if
and only if capital (de)increases. As we have just seen above, when the mobility of assets becomes
imperfect, the debt relief has also an effect through some crowding-out effect in some countries.
The debt transfer does no more consist only in a redistribution of income as in the case of perfect
mobility of asset. It is a way to direct financial help in favor of capital accumulation in the
recipient country. Therefore, debt transfer can be seen as more general than just a redistribution
of income through taxes.
6 Concluding remarks
Starting from the difficulties to implement effective environmental policies to fight pollutant
emissions, the use of macroeconomic policy instruments. In an international context, we question
the effect of debt transfer in favor of poor countries, the overall debt level remaining unchanged.
Despite the fact that debt reliefs from rich to poor countries is actually an insignificant instrument
used to promote climate change actions, we ask theoretically whether it should be more intensively
considered.
We show that debt relief for poor countries, with low productivity, makes it possible to en-
gage these countries in the process of pollution abatement. The efficiency of this policy strongly
depends on the preferences of households in each country. Not only the sensitivity to environ-
mental quality plays a key role, but also the time preference, that is a determinant of the saving
rate. We highlight that, if the poor country is sufficiently patient, richer countries should help
poorer countries to better fight pollutant emissions, even if indebted. This configuration gives
interest to a debt relief in favor of poor countries. This conclusion does not applied if agents in
the poor country are impatient. In that case, we reveal that there are some limits to implement
debt transfer to achieve global environmental objectives. Debt transfer should be accompanied
by other policy programs, aiming at modifying behaviors for instance. Otherwise, it is damaging
for the environment and reduces the stock of capital, even if it can favor the participation of the
poor-impatient country to mitigate climate change. Thus, our results provide intuitions about
the difficulties of aid transfer programs to improve the donor and the recipient well-being, and
the conditions to make them effective.
7 Appendix
7.1 Phase diagram when γF is arbitrarily small and close to 0
We easily see from (30), that ϕ(kDt) is strictly increasing (ϕ(kDt)′ > 0) and concave (ϕ(kDt)′′ <
0), with limkDt→0 ϕ(kDt) = −∞ and limkDt→+∞ ϕ(kDt) = +∞.
Using equation (31), we have limkDt→0 ψ(kDt) = +∞ and limkDt→+∞ ψ(kDt) = +∞, with
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limkDt→+∞ ψ(kDt)/ϕ(kDt) = +∞. We can also show that ψ′′(kDt) > 0. Since limkDt→0 ψ′(kDt) =
−∞ and limkDt→+∞ ψ′(kDt) > 0, ψ(kDt) is a convex function, decreasing for low values of kDt
and increasing for high values of kDt.
By direct inspection of (30) and (32), we easily see that CD(kDt) is increasing and concave,
with limkDt→0CD(kDt) = −∞, limkDt→+∞CD(kDt) = +∞ and CD(kDt) > ϕ(kDt) for all kDt > 0.
By direct inspection of equation (33), under Assumptions 1-3, the two terms into brackets are
positive. It implies that CF (kDt) is decreasing and convex, with limkDt→0CF (kDt) = +∞ and
limkDt→+∞CF (kDt) = −∞
Now, we examine the conditions such that ϕ(kDt) > CF (kDt):
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists k > 0 such that ϕ(kDt) > max{0;CF (kDt)} for
all kDt > k.
Proof. Using (30) and (33), ϕ(kDt) > CF (kDt) is equivalent to F (kDt) 6 F˜ , with:
F (kDt) ≡ αk−1Dt −
1
AD
k−αDt (52)
F˜ ≡
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
γD
1+βD − φ(1− α)
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α γF
1+βF
φ
(
bDγD
1+βD −
bF γF
1+βF
) > 0 (53)
We can show that F (kDt) decreases from +∞ to F ≡ (α− 1)A−
1
1−α
D (< 0) when kDt increases
from 0 to k̂ ≡ A
1
1−α
D and increases to 0 when kDt increases from k̂ to +∞. Using these properties,
there is a unique k1 > 0 such that F (kDt) 6 F˜ for all kt > k1.
Moreover, ϕ(kDt) > 0 is equivalent to F (kDt) < F0, with:
F0 ≡
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
φbD
(54)
there is a unique k0 > 0 such that F (kDt) < F0 for all kt > k0. We deduce the lemma by noting
k = max{k1; k0}.
For all kDt > k1, we have CD(kDt) > ϕ(kDt) > CF (kDt). To construct a phase digram and be
able to have a picture of global dynamics, we also need to analyse whether ψ(kDt) > CF (kDt).
Using (31) and (33), this inequality is equivalent to Γ(kDt) > 0, with:
Γ(kDt) ≡ kDt
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
− kαDt(1− α)AD
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
(
βF
1 + βF
+ βD1 + βF
γF
γD
)
− αkα−1Dt
[
AD
(
βDbD
1 + βD + γD
− βDγF bF(1 + βF )γD
)
−AF
(
βF bF
1 + βF
+ βDbD1 + βD + γD
)]
+ bD +
bF
1 + βF
[
1− γFβD
γD
]
(55)
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We deduce that limkDt→+∞ Γ(kDt) = +∞, which means that there is a value of k above which
ψ(kDt) > CF (kDt).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
A steady state is a solution (Et, kDt) = (Et+1, kDt+1) = (E, kD) satisfying equations (27) and
(28):
βD
γDφ
E = kD
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bD +
bF
1 + βF
− βF1 + βF
[
(1− α)AFkαD
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α − bFαADkα−1D
]
(56)
1 + βD
γD
E = −φbD
[
αADk
α−1
D − 1
]
+ADkαD
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
(57)
Using these two equations and substituting E, a steady state solves H1(kD) = H2(kD), where:
H1(kD) = G1kαD − F1kD (58)
H2(kD) = G2kα−1D + F2 (59)
with:
F1 = 1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
> 0 (60)
G1 = AF
βF
1 + βF
(1− α)
(
AF
AD
) α
1−α
+AD
βD
1 + βD
[
1− α− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
> 0 (61)
F2 =
bD
1 + βD
+ bF1 + βF
> 0 (62)
G2 = αAD
(
bDβD
1 + βD
+ bFβF1 + βF
)
> 0 (63)
See also Figure 4 which illustrates this steady state analysis with X1 = H1 and X2 = H2.
When bD = bF = 0, we have F2 = G2 = 0. Steady states are solutions solving H1(kD) = 0.
There are two solutions, kD = 0 and kD = (G1/F1)
1
1−α ≡ k̂.12 We note that H1(kD) is an inverse
U-shaped strictly concave function which attains its maximum value for kD = (αG1/F1)
1
1−α ≡ k.
This maximum value is equal to:
H1(k) = α
α
1−αG
1
1−α
1 F
− α1−α
1 (1− α) ≡ H1 (64)
By direct inspection of (59), we also see that, for a strictly positive bD and/or bF , H2(kD)
is strictly decreasing and convex, with limkD→0H2(kD) = +∞ and limkD→+∞H2(kD) = F2. In
12We recover the result presented in Muller-Furstenberger and Schumacher (2017), i.e without any debt there is
one unique non-trivial steady state.
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addition, we have H2(k) = F2 +G2F1/(αG1). Then, H2(k) 6 H1(k) if:
αF2G1 +G2F1 6 (1− α)α
1
1−αG
2−α
1−α
1 F
− α1−α
1 (65)
Using (62) and (63), we easily deduce that this last inequality is satisfied if bD and bF are low
enough. In this case, there are two stationary solutions to the equation H1(kD) = H2(kD). Since
a steady state satisfies (57), inequality (25) is fulfilled. We also note that since (56) and (57)
are independent of the parameter γF , a steady state (kD, E) does not depend on γF . Therefore,
inequality (26) evaluated at a steady state is satisfied for γF small enough. More precisely,
for a small γF , each steady state satisfies the condition to be in an asymmetric regime, i.e
ϕ(kD) > CF (kD).
From (65), if the following sufficient condition holds:
F2 > (1− α)α
α
1−αG
1
1−α
1 F
− α1−α
1 , (66)
we have H2(kD) > H1(kD) for all kD > 0 and there is no steady state. This last inequality is
satisfied if bD and/or bF are sufficiently high.
We further note that since both steady states are lower than k̂ = (G1/F1)
1
1−α , they are
characterized by under-accumulation if k̂ < (αAD)
1
1−α . Using (60) and (61), it is equivalent to:
α
1− α >
βD
1+βD +
βF
1+βF
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We examine the impact of debt variation on the stationary capital stocks and environmental
quality index. Using (58)-(63), we obtain:
dkD
dbi
=
βi
1+βiαADk
α−1
D + 11+βi
H ′1(kD)−H ′2(kD)
, for i = {D,F} (67)
We consider the following variation: dbD = −dbF = db. Using (67), we get:
dkD
db
=
(αADkα−1D − 1)( βD1+βD −
βF
1+βF )
H ′1(kD)−H ′2(kD)
(68)
We deduce the effect of debt transfer on capital taking into account that H ′1(kD) < H ′2(kD)
when kD = kh.
Then, we analyze how the environmental quality that prevails at the high steady state, i.e
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Eh, evolves with a debt transfer. Using (57) we have:
1 + βD
γD
dEh
db
= − φ(αADkα−1h − 1) + φbDADα(1− α)kα−2h
dkh
db
+ αADkα−1h
dkh
db
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
When βD > βF , we deduce that dEh/db < 0. We rewrite the previous expression to examine the
case βF > βD:
1 + βD
γD
dEh
db
= φ+φADαkα−1h
[
(1− α)kh/b − 1
]
+αADkα−1h
dkh
db
[
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
with kh/b ≡ dkhdb bDkh . Under Assumptions 1-3, kh/b is decreasing with kh. By inspection of
equation (68), this is easily shown by observing that H ′′2 (kD) > 0, H ′′1 (kD) < 0 and the steady
state level of capital is characterized by under-accumulation.
We also have dkhdb > 0 if inequality (34) is satisfied and βF > βD. As a result, the condition
kh/b > 1/(1 − α) guarantees dEhdb > 0. As the elasticity kh/b is a decreasing function of kh and
that kh < kˆ, a sufficient condition is to have
kˆ/b ≡
dkˆ
db
bD
kˆ
> 1/(1− α)
Using (58)-(63) and (67), this condition corresponds to
(1 + βD)(1 + βF )
bD(βF − βD) <
αADF1 −G1
G
2−α
1−α
1 F
−α
1−α
1 −G2F1
≡ X
and Proposition 2 follows.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We then examine the effect of a debt transfer on the agent’s welfare in both economies. Using
agent’s consumption choices, its indirect utility function along the high steady state is given by:
Vi = (1 + βi) ln(ci) + βi ln(Ri) + (δi + γi) ln(Eh) + βi ln βi
We decompose the welfare into a consumption (VCi) and an environmental (VEi) components.
Vi = (1 + βi) ln(ci) + βi ln(Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
VCi
+ (δi + γi) ln(Eh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
VEi
+βi ln βi (69)
The environmental part of the welfare evolves as the environment. We have SigndVEidb = Sign
dEh
db .
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Then, we examine how the consumption part of the welfare changes with a debt transfer.
Sign
dVCi
db
= Sign
{
(1 + βi)
dci
db
Ri + βi
dRi
db
ci
}
Given (14), we have
dRF
db
= dRD
db
= ADα(α− 1)kα−2h
dkh
db
Using (9), (11) and (57) we have:
cD =
E
γDφ
= 11 + βD
[
ADk
α
D
(
1− α− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
))
− bD
(
αADk
α−1
D − 1
)]
cF =
1
1 + βF
(wF − τF ) = 11 + βF
[
(1− α)ADkαD
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α − bF
(
αADk
α−1
D − 1
)]
Differentiating these equations, we get:
(1+βD)
dcD
db
= αADkα−1h
[
(1− α)− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
dkh
db
−(RD−1)+bDα(1−α)ADkα−2D
dkh
db
(1 + βF )
dcF
db
= αADkα−1h (1− α)
dkh
db
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
+ (RF − 1) + bFα(1− α)ADkα−2h
dkh
db
Finally, the sign of dVCD/db is given by the sign of:
(
1− (1− α)βD
α(1 + βD)
)[
(1− α)− θ
φ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)]
dkh
db
R2D︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect
+ bDRD(1− α)
kh
(
RD +
(RD − 1)βD
1 + βD
)
dkh
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
debt burden effect
− (RD − 1)RD︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct debt effect
(70)
and the sign of dVCF /db by the sign of:
(
1− (1−α)βFα(1+βF )
)
dkh
db
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α (1− α)R2F
+ bFRF (1−α)kh
(
RF + (RF−1)βF1+βF
)
dkh
db + (RF − 1)RF
(71)
By inspection of (70) and (71), the income effect in both countries is positive when α/(1−α) >
max
{
βD
1+βD ;
βF
1+βF
}
. This condition ensures that the two countries under-accumulates capital. In
this case, the condition (34) that guarantees that the capital at the international level is necessarily
lower than the golden rule is always satisfied.
Proposition 3 follows from these last results.
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7.5 Phase diagram when γF is significant
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, there exists k1 > 0 such that CF (kDt) < ϕ(kDt) for
all kDt < k1. This upper bound k1 increases with bF γF1+βF −
bDγD
1+βD . In addition, there exists k0(< k1)
such that ϕ(kDt) > 0 for all kDt > k0 if:
bD
bF
<
φ(1− α)− θ
(
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
)
φ(1− α)
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
(72)
Proof. Since bF γF1+βF >
bDγD
1+βD , ϕ(kDt) > CF (kDt) is equivalent to F (kDt) > F˜ , where F (kDt) is
given by (52) and F˜ by (53). Under Assumption 4, F˜ > 0 which means that there exists a unique
k1 > 0 such that F (kDt) > F˜ for all kDt < k1. Using (52) and (53), we also deduce that k1
increases with bF γF1+βF −
bDγD
1+βD .
Moreover, ϕ(kDt) > 0 is equivalent to F (kDt) < F0, with F0 > 0 given by (54). F0 > F˜ is
ensured by inequality (72). In this case, there exists k0 lower than k1 such that F (kDt) < F0 for
all kDt > k0.
We still have that ψ(kDt) > CF (kDt) is equivalent to Γ(kDt) > 0, where Γ(kDt) is given by (55).
However, under Assumption 4, we deduce that limkDt→0 Γ(kDt) = +∞, limkDt→+∞ Γ(kDt) = +∞
and Γ(kDt) is convex:
Γ′′(kDt) = kα−2Dt α(1− α)2AD
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
(
βF
1 + βF
+ βD1 + βF
γF
γD
)
− α(α− 1)(α− 2)kα−3Dt
[
AD
(
βDbD
1 + βD + γD
− βDγF bF(1 + βF )γD
)
−AF
(
βF bF
1 + βF
+ βDbD1 + βD + γD
)]
> 0
This means that ψ(kDt) is higher than CF (kDt) at least for kDt low or high enough.
Under Assumption 3, we observe, using (42), that Ω(kDt) is strictly increasing (Ω(kDt)′ > 0)
and concave (Ω(kDt)′′ < 0), with limkDt→0 Ω(kDt) = −∞ and limkDt→+∞Ω(kDt) = +∞.
By inspection of equation (43), we have limkDt→0 Π(kDt) = +∞ and limkDt→+∞Π(kDt) =
+∞, with limkDt→+∞Π(kDt)/Ω(kDt) = +∞. We can also show that Π′′(kDt) > 0. Since
limkDt→0 Π′(kDt) = −∞ and limkDt→+∞Π′(kDt) > 0, Π(kDt) is a convex function, decreasing
for low values of kDt and increasing for high values of kDt.
We can further study whether CF (kDt) > Ω(kDt). After some computations, we can show
that when bF γF1+βF >
bDγD
1+βD , this inequality is equivalent to F (kDt) 6 F˜ . Using Lemma 2, we
immediately deduce that this is satisfied for kDt > k1. This means of course that ϕ(k1) = Ω(k1).
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
A steady state is defined by E = Ω(kD) and
1
φ
E
(
βD
γD
+ βF
γF
)
= kD
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
+ bD + bF (73)
with E < min {CF (kD), CD(kD)}. Using these equations, a steady state is a solution kD to the
equation I(kD) = J(kD), with:
I(kD) = I1 + I2kα−1D (74)
J(kD) = J1kαD − J2kD (75)
and
I1 = (bD + bF )
γF + γD
(1 + βD)γF + (1 + βF )γD
> 0 (76)
I2 = (bD + bF )
γFβD + γDβF
(1 + βD)γF + (1 + βF )γD
αAD > 0 (77)
J1 =
(γFβD + γDβF )AD [φ(1− α)− θ]
[
1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α
]
(1 + βD)γF + (1 + βF )γD
> 0 (78)
J2 = 1 +
(
AF
AD
) 1
1−α ≡ F1 > 0 (79)
The analysis for the existence and multiplicity of steady states is quite similar to the case
with aDt > 0 and aFt = 0. Figure 4 illustrates the steady state analysis for the symmetric case,
with X1 = I and X2 = J . Indeed, J(kD) is an inverse U-shaped strictly concave function which
attains its maximum value for kD = (αJ1/J2)
1
1−α ≡ kJ , with:
J(kJ) = α
α
1−αJ
1
1−α
1 J
− α1−α
2 (1− α) (80)
If bD + bF = 0, we have I1 = I2 = 0. Steady states are solutions solving J(kD) = 0. There
are two solutions, kD = 0 and kD = (J1/J2)
1
1−α ≡ k̂s.
If bD+bF > 0, we see that I(kD) is strictly decreasing and convex, with limkD→0I(kD) = +∞
and limkD→+∞I(kD) = I1. We have I(kJ) 6 J(kJ) iff:
αJ1I1 + J2I2 6 (1− α)α
1
1−αJ
2−α
1−α
1 J
− α1−α
2 (81)
Using (76)-(79), we note that J1 and J2 do not depend on bD and bF , while I1 and I2 both
linearly increase with bD + bF . Therefore, inequality (81) is satisfied if bD + bF is low enough.
In this case, there are two stationary solutions to the equation H1(kD) = H2(kD). The steady
states are admissible if E < min{CF (kD), CD(kD)} is satisfied for each steady state.
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On the contrary, if:
I1 > α
α
1−αJ
1
1−α
1 J
− α1−α
2 (1− α) (82)
we have I(kD) > J(kD) for all kD > 0. This last inequality is satisfied if bD + bF is sufficiently
high. In this case, there is no steady state.
In the case in which there exist two steady states, we know that their associated levels of
capital are lower than k̂s = (J1/J2)
1
1−α . Thus, they are characterized by under-accumulation
if k̂s < (αAD)
1
1−α . Using (78) and (79), this condition can be written as inequality (44) and
Proposition 4 follows.
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Figure 4 – Steady state analysis
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